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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3061 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
   
v. 
 
JOHN HIGH, 
   Appellant 
______________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cr-00601-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
______________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 4, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,* District Judge  
 
(Filed: August 25, 2016) 
   
 
OPINION** 
   
                                                          
 * The Honorable Anne E. Thompson, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
 
 ** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant John High challenges his twenty-four month sentence following the 
revocation of his supervised release, arguing that the sentence was procedurally and 
substantively unreasonable.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 High is a seventy-eight-year-old man who pleaded guilty to possession of child 
pornography in 2012 and was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment—a 
sentence substantially below the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range for his offense1—
followed by five years of supervised release.  As part of his supervised release, High 
agreed to use only computers installed with court ordered monitoring software and to 
participate in a sex offender treatment program.  High admits that, within three months of 
commencing supervised release, he violated these conditions when he used an 
unauthorized computer at a public library to look up a nearby nudist camp and visited 
that nudist camp on four separate occasions, where, at least once, he spoke with a minor 
and was asked by the camp director to leave.  According to the probation officer’s report, 
rather than disclosing these violations to the proper authorities, High called the director 
and asked that he be allowed to return.  The camp director, who had investigated High 
and learned he was a registered sex offender, subsequently alerted High’s probation 
officer.    
                                                          
 1 High’s initial offense called for a Guidelines range of fifty-one to sixty-three 
months, but the District Court varied significantly downward on account of High’s age, 
prior military record, and good works.   
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 As a result of these violations, the District Court held a revocation hearing.  The 
Government submitted a sentencing memorandum requesting a sentence at the statutory 
maximum of twenty-four months despite the three to nine months Guidelines range.  At 
the sentencing hearing, High argued for a sentence within the Guidelines range, asking 
the Court to consider his old age, deteriorating mental condition, that he had no prior 
criminal record, and the effect a long sentence would have on his ailing wife.  The Court 
imposed the maximum sentence of twenty-four months, and High made no objections on 
the record at the time.  High now appeals, arguing that the District Court’s ruling was 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and requesting a remand for resentencing.  
II. Standard of Review 
 A sentence challenged for procedural and substantive reasonableness is usually 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010), 
but where, as here, the defendant did not object to a procedural error at the time the 
sentence was imposed, we review the District Court’s sentence for plain error, United 
States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  A party claiming 
plain error must prove that: (1) the court erred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) it 
“affect[ed] substantial rights.”  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).  For “substantial rights” to 
be affected, “‘the error must have been prejudicial,’ that is, ‘[i]t must have affected the 
outcome of the district court proceedings.’”  United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 242 
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734); see also Puckett v. United States, 556 
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U.S. 129, 142 n.4 (2009) (explaining that when the defendant’s rights “relate to 
sentencing, the outcome he must show to have been affected is his sentence”).  In 
addition, the error must “seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2001) (en 
banc). 
III. Discussion 
 High argues his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the District 
Court failed to follow the procedural steps required under our precedent, and that the 
District Court’s decision to impose the maximum sentence permitted under the statute 
was substantively unreasonable because no reasonable jurist could have viewed his 
conduct as the worst case scenario.  We will address each argument in turn.  
A. Procedural Unreasonableness 
 Prior to sentencing, courts are required to perform three steps on the record 
designed to ensure procedural soundness: (1) calculate a defendant’s Guidelines range; 
(2) formally rule on any departure motions and state how those rulings affect the advisory 
range; and (3) exercise discretion by considering the relevant factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  High 
argues that the District Court failed to address each of these steps.   
 Upon review of the record, High is correct that the District Court should have 
independently calculated the Guidelines range under step one of the Gunter framework.  
Nonetheless, High does not meet his high burden to show that he was prejudiced by this, 
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as he acknowledges in his brief that the appropriate Guidelines range was three to nine 
months and does not argue or provide support for the contention that his sentence would 
have been any different had the District Court independently calculated the range.  See 
Stevens, 223 F.3d at 242.  Indeed the three-to-nine-months range was undisputed by the 
parties.  High’s probation officer included that three range in the report filed with the 
Court, the Government stated the range in both its brief (a copy of which was served to 
High) and at sentencing (where High was present), and High’s counsel did not object 
when the Government explicitly stated at sentencing that the “[G]uidelines in this case of 
three to nine months are not adequate.”  App. 24a.  There is no indication that the District 
Court’s failure to independently calculate the range “affected the outcome of the 
[sentencing] proceedings.”  See Stevens, 223 F.3d at 242 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). 
 We disagree with High’s argument that the District Court failed to address the 
remaining two Gunter steps.  As neither party raised any departure motions, the District 
Court did not err by declining to state on the record its ruling on departure motions.  Nor 
did the Court fail to give meaningful consideration to the mitigation factors set forth in § 
3553(a).  On the contrary, it addressed all of High’s mitigation arguments, explaining that 
it had already given High a “second chance at the time of [the original] sentencing based 
on [his] age, the situation with [his] wife, [and] the fact that [he] had no prior contact 
with the criminal justice system,” App. 31a; see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 
(2007) (finding the sentencing judge’s “brief” statement of reasons “legally sufficient” 
when the record made clear that the judge “listened to each [of Petitioner’s] argument[s]” 
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and “considered the supporting evidence”).  Moreover, the District Court addressed an 
additional § 3553(a) factor—the “need for the sentence imposed”—when it stressed four 
times the need to protect the community.   See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).2   
 As the District Court sufficiently addressed steps two and three under Gunter, and 
High was not prejudiced when the District Court did not independently calculate the 
sentencing range, we conclude that High’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.   
B. Substantive Unreasonableness 
 Our review for substantive reasonableness is “highly deferential,” Bungar, 478 
F.3d at 543, and the defendant bears the burden to show that “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence . . . for the reasons the district court 
provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  High 
argues that the District Court’s sentence at the twenty-four month statutory maximum 
was substantively unreasonable because his conduct was not equal to the worst possible 
scenario, namely that he only spoke to a minor and did not touch the child or attempt to 
send the child pictures.  We disagree.   
 First, the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines expressly allows for increased 
sentences in cases involving “high risk” behavior, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.3, and even 
High’s counsel admits that, in visiting a nudist camp where children were present on four 
                                                          
 2 Even if the Court could have discussed more thoroughly the mitigating factors 
listed at § 3553(a), we have not required a step-by-step analysis of each factor to find a 
sentence procedurally reasonable, especially when those factors are not argued by the 
parties.  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the court 
need not “discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record 
makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing”).  
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separate occasions, High engaged in such behavior.  In fact, the Guidelines commentary 
indicates that an upward departure may be warranted for a sex offender who, similar to 
High, violates the conditions of his release by associating with children near a 
schoolyard.  Id.   
 Second, we have held that when a sentence is imposed for a violation of the 
conditions of supervised release, the sentence must “primarily . . . sanction the 
defendant's breach of trust while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness 
of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”  Bungar, 478 F.3d at 
544.  Here, High’s actions were both serious and a significant breach of trust: he 
continually violated the terms of his supervised release and began doing so within months 
of his release—both by using an unmonitored computer and by visiting the nudist 
camp—until he was finally detected by the camp director and reported following his 
fourth trip to the camp.  Moreover, according to the probation officer’s report, High 
showed no signs of stopping his improper behavior given his attempt to obtain 
permission from the camp director to return after being asked not to come back. 
 In light of the seriousness and the nature of these violations, we cannot say that no 
reasonable sentencing court would have also imposed the maximum sentence on High. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  This is particularly true where High’s initial sentence for 
possession of child pornography was below the Guidelines range—a fact that renders an 
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increased sentence for later charges more appropriate.  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n4.3  
Therefore, the District Court’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable.  
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District 
Court.  
                                                          
 3 In his brief, High directs us to two cases in which neither court imposed the 
statutory maximum arguing that, because the defendants’ actions in those cases were 
more egregious than here, High’s maximum sentence must be substantively 
unreasonable.  See United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014); United States 
v. Carter, 730 F.3d 187 (3d. Cir 2013).  Even if we agreed with that proposition, “it is not 
the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as 
to the appropriateness of a particular sentence[.]”  Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 
(1983).  Moreover, we have made clear that the district court is in “the best position to 
determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.”  
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 561.  Because we accord “great deference to [its] choice of final 
sentence,” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007), High’s effort to 
compare his actions and his sentence to other cases is insufficient to find substantive 
unreasonableness. 
